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PURE AS RUNNING WATER: A CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT  
FOR UTAH’S PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
 
Brandon S. Fuller* 
 
In the West, “Whiskey is for drinkin’ and water’s for fightin’.”1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Water rights in America, particularly in western states, have been a pervasive 
source of legal contention.2 The histories of these water rights, and the public trust 
doctrine more broadly,3 have created a tremendously complex area of law. This field 
of law is very old and draws on policy concerns stretching back to 100 B.C., 
overlapping federal and state powers and precedents, and what can only be described 
as one of the longest games of jurisprudential telephone in existence.4 As a result, 
anyone seeking to challenge a state statute, court opinion, or regulation, which they 
believe impermissibly restricts the public’s right to use the waters, has a big job 
ahead of them. The party must take on the daunting task of organizing hundreds of 
years of law into a coherent argument and accounting for every nuance which may 
lurk in a myriad of state and federal opinions published on the issue.5  
                                                        
* © 2019 Brandon S. Fuller. Fuller is a third-year law student at the University of Utah 
S.J. Quinney College of Law. First and foremost, I would like to thank my grandfather, 
Douglas A. Smith, for instilling in me the importance of water rights in the State of Utah. I 
would also like to thank the Utah Law Review board and staff—in particular Kayla Weiser, 
Jennifer Joslin, and the Junior Staff Copyworkers—for their tireless work and attention to 
detail. 
1 Though this quote is often attributed to Mark Twain, it is uncertain whether Twain 
actually said it. Whiskey Is for Drinking; Water Is for Fighting Over, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR 
(June 3, 2013), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/06/03/whiskey-water/ [https://perma.cc/ 
7522-L76U].  
2 See generally Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971) (providing an example of a 
State’s suit against the federal government to determine navigability for title of waters). 
3 In short, the public trust doctrine requires the state to hold navigable waters in trust 
for the use of the citizens of that state, and to not dispose of those trust resources unless doing 
so does not impair the interest of the people and where the disposal would serve the people’s 
best interest. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).  
4 See discussion infra Section II.  
5 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435 (noting that ownership of and dominion 
and sovereignty over land covered by fresh water, within the limits of several states, belongs 
to the respective states within which it is found); Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 900 
(Utah 2008) (“While the public owns state waters, the beds that lie beneath those waters may 
be privately owned.”); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 
1136–37 (Utah 1982) (holding that the public has recreational rights in the waters of a lake 
even though it is entirely surrounded by a landowner’s private property). 
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Analysis of a public trust issue in Utah comes with some unique difficulties. 
First, unlike some states, Utah has not constitutionalized their public trust doctrine.6 
This creates problems in deciding these issues because jurisprudence concerning the 
public trust doctrine, as it exists in Utah now, is based on court decisions7 and 
statutes,8 rather than constitutional text. Both of these sources of law provide 
imperfect protection of the public’s right to the water and provide unstable footing 
for a case seeking to challenge any impermissible restriction of the waters of the 
state. Second, Utah’s rivers tend to be mountainous, obstructed, or low-flowing.9 
This makes the determination of the river’s navigability for title purposes difficult, 
as the traditional test for navigability requires some form of commercial use.10 
Finally, for years private property owners, who have been paying taxes on 
streambeds that cross their property, are concerned that the state’s upholding of 
public trust protections for those rivers will allow citizens to come onto their private 
property for recreational purposes, effectively extinguishing their right to exclude.11 
According to private property owners, upholding the public’s right to use the waters 
of the state, where they cross private land, implicates potential takings claims from 
the government, title assurance issues for the defect of having a government 
easement on the land years after the land was bought, and the inability to exercise 
their right to exclude others from their land.12  
                                                        
6 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust 
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public 
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 183 (2010).  
7 See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah 
1937) (“The title [to public waters] is in the public; all are equal owners; that is, have coequal 
rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control thereof.”); J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136 
(“Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in 
this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the State must 
therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare 
of the people of the State as a whole.”); Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Orange St. Dev., 416 
P.3d 553, 565 (Utah 2017) (“Under United States Supreme Court precedent and our 
constitution, the people of this State hold an interest in the lands held by the State under the 
public trust doctrine, including land under navigable waters.”). 
8 See UTAH CODE §§ 73-29-201 to -208 (2018). 
9 National Water Information System: Web Interface, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
https://waterdata.usgs.gov/ut/nwis/current/?type=flow [https://perma.cc/KE32-FCBL] (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2018).  
10 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871) superseded by statute, Clean Water Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-277, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as recognized in Rapanos v. United States 547 
U.S. 715 (2006); see also Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435. 
11 UTAH CODE § 73-29-201(1) (2018) (“The public may use a public water for 
recreational activity if . . . the public water . . . is a navigable water; or . . . is on public 
property; and . . . the recreational activity is not otherwise prohibited by law.”). 
12 38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d Easements not of record § 19 (1996) (“Agreement, 
referenced in title commitment, to create an easement if, in the future, one was required, did 
not place purchasers on notice of future easement, and thus did not preclude breach of 
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This Note will provide a survey of relevant history and law relating to the public 
trust doctrine, as well as the history and development of the public trust doctrine in 
the state of Utah.13 Using this history, this Note will then argue that, based on federal 
and state precedent and the relevant constitutional provisions, the courts should 
recognize a constitutional right to use the waters of Utah for lawful recreational use, 
regardless of who owns the lands beneath the waters.14 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
One of the major difficulties in dealing with public trust issues at law is that the 
law itself is very old and often does not provide a relevant basis on which to 
adjudicate modern issues.15 Moreover, this dated precedent was created to serve 
public policies or protect public interests that are no longer commonly at issue.16 To 
understand how modern public trust analysis works, one must know how the public 
trust doctrine came to be and how it developed over the years. 
 
A.  Ancient Roots 
 
The public trust doctrine has its roots in Roman law and philosophy.17 During 
the formation of the Roman empire, the common conception of people’s right to use 
natural resources rested on two main principles: First, our universe was created by a 
divine being; and second, the divine being created air, water, land, and sunlight for 
the coequal use of all people.18 Around the time of Cicero, in 100–25 B.C., this way 
of thinking began to be codified in formal law.19 The codification rejected the view 
that any individual could own—and exclude others from—the natural things 
                                                        
contract and negligence action against title company based on failure to include easement in 
title commitment . . .”) (citing Izynski v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 963 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2012)). 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 654 (Utah 
1937) (providing a discussion of an early public trust issue in Utah in which the main 
considerations were agricultural and culinary uses of the stream in question). In contrast to 
the Adams precedent, many modern concerns relating to the use of navigable waters in Utah 
are based on recreational uses and property rights. The difference in the public’s ability to 
use the waters of the state for purposes necessary for survival and the public’s ability to use 
the waters for leisure makes many of the policy concerns supporting older precedent 
somewhat less compelling to enforce a right to recreation. 
16 See id. at 654. 
17 Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1968); see also Craig, supra note 6, at 59.  
18 NORMAN E. BOWIE & ROBERT L. SIMON, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE POLITICAL 
ORDER: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (4th ed. 2007). 
19 Id.  
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necessary for human survival, primarily running water and air.20 Cicero was a prime 
advocate for this idea, which he hoped would ensure that developing property laws 
would not become the enemy of the common people.21 By 500 A.D., natural law 
became the basis for many formal Roman Laws.22 According to the Roman Institutes 
of the Justinian codex, “[b]y natural law common to all—the air, running water, the 
sea, and consequently the sea-shore. No one therefore is forbidden access to the sea-
shore . . . for these are not, like the sea itself, subject to the law of nations.”23 
The historical roots of the public trust doctrine are not based on complex and 
antiquated statutes, but on natural law; a simple, commonly held conception of what 
the law ought to be.24 Since then, many leaps and bounds have been made in 
technology and society, and the public trust doctrine has been codified by many 
governing bodies in many ways.25 However, it is important to keep in mind the basic 
system of equities upon which these codifications are based. 
 
B.  The Public Trust Doctrine in American Federal Law 
 
The American system for establishing water rights did not change the equation 
much. During the establishment of the American Colonies, water resources were 
utilized in much the same way as in the Roman system of laws.26 After the American 
Revolution, the newly established American government acquired the rights to 
navigable streambeds from England and the governments of each state were granted 
the rights to all the waters of their state, to be “held in trust for the people.”27 When 
additional states were admitted to the Union, they were admitted on terms equal to 
                                                        
20 Id. at 57. 
21 Id. at 55 (“There is indeed a law, right reason, which is in accordance with nature; 
existing in all, unchangeable, eternal . . . It is not one thing at Rome, and another thing at 
Athens . . . but it is law, eternal and immutable for all nations and for all time.”). 
22 Id. 
23 THOMAS COLLETT SANDARS, INSTITUTES OF THE JUSTINIAN, BOOK II OF THINGS 35 
(J. B. Moyle trans., 4th ed.1906).  
24 Id. at 565. 
25 See generally Craig, supra note 6, at 93–194 (providing individualized background 
on states’ public trust doctrines in the appendix). Many states have navigability tests which 
are closely tied to the environmental exigencies of their state. For example, Alaska is the 
only state which defines navigable waters as those waters which it is possible to land a 
seaplane on. Id. at 75. Of course, the possibility of landing a sea plane is enough, courts do 
not require brave seaplane pilots to actually land a plane on a borderline body of water to 
determine navigability at trial.  
26 See Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 654 (Utah 
1937). 
27 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (“It is a title held in trust 
for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties.”). 
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those of the original thirteen colonies.28 This legal practice came to be known as the 
equal footing doctrine.29 This doctrine granted all new states the title to tidal and 
navigable waters as of the date those states joined the Union.30  
 
1.  Federal Ownership and the Definition of Navigability 
 
The federal government’s Commerce Clause31 power provides that the 
government may hold title to certain waterways based on their availability for 
commercial use.32 The government preserves commercial freedom by regulating the 
“channels” of interstate commerce.33 These channels include navigable waterways 
on which commerce could occur.34 Therefore, the first step in any public trust 
analysis is to determine whether the waters are navigable.35 If the waters are 
navigable, U.S. Supreme Court precedent vests title to those waters in the state.36 
However, this ownership is subject to certain duties.37 The primary duty is to 
preserve the use of the navigable waterway as a channel of commerce.38 The 
secondary duty is to use the water for the benefit of the citizens of the state.39  
The federal test for navigability has undergone many changes to adapt both to 
policy considerations of local government and citizens and the varying physical 
properties of waterways.40 The original test for navigability comes from the Supreme 
                                                        
28 See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842); see also Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988). 
29 See Craig, supra note 6, at 63.  
30 See id. 
31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 3. 
32 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  
33 29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2017). 
34 Id. 
35 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 562 (1870). This case examines the issue of 
navigability extensively, and provides extensive accounts of the differences between 
domestic streams, commercial rivers, and the historic English “tidal waters” test. Id. at 563–
64. Though The Daniel Ball was eventually superseded by statute, its text is still relevant in 
this context to track the history of our definition of navigability for title purposes.  
36 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
37 See Craig, supra note 6, at 64–70. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 See id. The original test for navigability, still used in some eastern states, is the tidal 
ebb and flow test. Id. at 56. According to this test, waters which could be influenced by lunar 
tides were navigable for title. Id. This test was problematic for western states, where such 
bodies of water were few and far between. Id. at 64. As a result, the test became closely 
linked to the ability of the waters to be used for commerce. Id. at 65. The particular character 
of accepted commercial use varies greatly from state to state. Id. For example, in Montana 
and Oregon, the accepted test is the ability to float railroad ties or timber down the river. Id. 
at 140, 165. 
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Court’s opinion in The Daniel Ball.41 This test takes a narrow definition of 
commerce and restricts federal ownership to only those rivers which are navigable 
by large commercial vessels. “[T]hey are navigable in fact when they are used, or 
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, 
over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade 
and travel on water.”42 In this case, the Court found that the Grand River was 
navigable because it was “capable of bearing a steamer of one hundred and twenty-
three tons burden, laden with merchandise and passengers, as far as Grand Rapids, 
a distance of forty miles from its mouth in Lake Michigan.”43  
The Daniel Ball set the first clear standard for navigability.44 However, a series 
of cases followed this decision, which sought to clarify the federal standard of 
navigability in a variety of contexts.45 The Montello, just four years later, broadened 
the rule slightly, holding that a river need not be used for major commerce to be 
considered navigable by the federal standard. “If it be capable in its natural state of 
being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may 
be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.”46 
Additionally, in United States v. Utah, the Court took a firmer stance on the nature 
of navigable waters. “The extent of existing commerce is not the test . . . . [W]here 
conditions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature 
of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be 
satisfactorily proved.”47 Essentially, waters which were capable of being used for 
commerce were considered navigable, regardless of the amount of commerce the 
waters were actually used for.48 Later, Utah v. United States added the contour that 
waters did not need to be actually engaged in that commerce in order to be 
considered navigable by the federal test.49 
  
                                                        
41 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 557 (1870); see also The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 437 
(1874) (using the test articulated in The Daniel Ball).  
42 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. 
43 Id. at 564. 
44 Id. at 557. 
45 See The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441–42 (clarifying the scope of the Court’s rule, and 
holding that the correct test is not whether a river was capable of being navigated by steam 
or sail vessels, but whether the public could use the river for purposes of transportation and 
commerce in its natural state, regardless of the mode of commerce); Utah v. United States, 
403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (holding that the Great Salt Lake satisfies the federal test for 
navigability when ranchers used the lake as a highway to transport livestock). 
46 The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441–42. 
47 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). 
48 Id. 
49 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971) (providing that whether or not the waters 
are currently being used in commerce, if they were capable of being used in commerce at the 
time of statehood, those waters are considered navigable for title). 
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2.  Illinois Central Railroad v. United States and the Modern Public Trust Doctrine 
 
The federal test for navigability, established in The Daniel Ball, The Montello, 
and Utah v. United States, created the principal that some streambeds were owned 
by the state and some were not.50 However, this line of cases mainly dealt with the 
clarification of title issues.51 The question of what exactly a state should do once a 
court determines that they have title to a streambed remained open until 1892 when 
the Court decided Illinois Central Railway Company v. Illinois.52 This case 
established the public trust doctrine in modern law by first acknowledging the duty 
that states owed to the federal government to keep waterways open for commerce,53 
and second, by establishing the states’ duty to “preserve such waters for the use of 
the public.”54  
Illinois Central created the mandate for states to establish a public trust doctrine 
to preserve the public’s interest in fishing, navigation, and commerce.55 The case 
established that 
 
[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, 
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the 
public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment 
of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.56  
 
This quotation illustrates two contentious points in modern case law: states have title 
to navigable waters to hold those waters in trust for the people, and the state may not 
abdicate its duty under the trust.57 However, the state may “dispose” of lands, so 
                                                        
50 See id. at 14 (holding that since the lake was navigable at the time Utah became a 
state, Utah’s claim of ownership overrode any claim of the United States); The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. 557, 557 (1870) (“[T]hey constitute navigable waters of the United States[,] . . . in 
contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form their ordinary 
condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which 
commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreigin countries in the customary 
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.”); The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443–45 
(holding that the Ordinance of 1787 was not needed to establish or preserve the national 
character of the rivers because of their importance for communication and commerce). 
51 See, e.g., Utah, 403 U.S. at 9–10 (characterizing the nature of the claim as “Utah’s 
claim to the lands is premised on the navigability of the lake”). 
52 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
53 Id. at 435. 
54 Id. at 453. 
55 Id. at 435. 
56 Id. at 453. 
57 See Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A Lakeside View 
into the Trustees’ World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 133 (2012). Though this article specifically 
discusses Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the requirements on the trustee to preserve the 
waters for use of the people remain largely the same from state to state. See also Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 435. 
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long as doing so serves the best interest of the citizens of the state for whom the trust 
is held.58 A classic example of permissible disposal of these lands is the practice of 
selling portions of navigable water to private companies on the condition that those 
companies build a dock to enhance the ability of the public to use the waters for 
commerce.59 The key is that the state may not take any action, which may have the 
effect of damaging the public’s interest in the use of the waters in question.60 If it 
would serve the public better to dispose of the waters and grant title to a third party, 
the state may do so under Illinois Central.61  
Another key point in Illinois Central is that each state is left to establish its own 
public trust doctrine.62 As a result, individual states’ public trust doctrines differ 
considerably.63 As such, when bringing a public trust lawsuit in a given state, it is 
not enough to pull sources from federal precedent and to have an understanding of 
what other states are doing because what works in one state may be illegal in 
another.64  
 
C.  History of Utah’s Public Trust Doctrine 
 
Thus far, this Note has provided a brief background of public trust principals 
relevant to federal law and the doctrine’s broader history. This information greatly 
informs how Utah has developed and has come to manage its own public trust 
doctrine, which is relevant to understanding how Utah courts will handle this issue. 
This section will examine the unique jurisprudential background and geographic 
characteristics of Utah and how those factors played in Utah’s modern conception 
of public trust law. 
                                                        
58 See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894). 
59 See id. (holding that a state granting title to a private party so that the party could 
build a dock on the public waterway was a disposal of the trust for the benefit of the people, 
and therefore allowable in light of the Illinois Central mandate to administer the trust for the 
benefit of the people).  
60 Id.  
61 This is another sticking point in modern litigation of public trust issues. All Illinois 
Central says is that a state must hold the waters in trust for the people and may dispose of 
the waters so long as doing so does not affect the peoples’ interest in using the water. See 
Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 77 (1902). Cases subsequent to Illinois 
Central establish that, so long as the disposal serves the best interest of the public, a state 
may in fact dispose of the waters. Mere disposal of the waters does not indicate prima facie 
abdication of the duties under the trust, the abdication must actually harm the public’s interest 
in the waters. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012). 
62 See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 603 (“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, 
however, which is the constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the 
public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law . . . .”). 
63 See Craig, supra note 6, at 71–91.  
64 See Craig, supra note 6, at 94–194. 
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Under the equal footing doctrine, title to navigable waters within the State of 
Utah was vested in the Utah government at the time of statehood, on January 4, 
1896.65 Once these rights vested, the government of the State of Utah was 
responsible for creating proper safeguards to ensure that the state—as trustee—
upheld its duties under the public trust doctrine.  
 
1.  Public Trust Protections in Utah’s Constitution 
 
Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine, unlike some other 
states.66 This is problematic because when parties sue claiming a right to access 
public waters, they cannot argue that the right has a constitutional basis, which 
makes it easier for the courts and legislature to limit public access to state waters.67 
However, while Utah never expressly constitutionalized its public trust doctrine, 
certain articles of the Utah Constitution are relevant to the issue. For example, 
Article XX, section 1 states, “[a]ll lands of the State that have been . . . granted to 
the State . . . are declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust 
for the people . . . for the respective purposes for which they [were] . . . acquired.”68 
This provision problematically leaves waters out of its consideration and thus falls 
just short of being a perfect constitutional expression of the public trust doctrine for 
protecting water rights.69 However, the protection of lands otherwise acquired by the 
State provides an important foothold for arguing for the protection of the public’s 
interest in water rights. 
Additionally, in Article XVII, section 1, the Utah Constitution provides 
protections for existing water rights for beneficial uses: “All existing rights to the 
use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby 
recognized and confirmed.”70 This provision likewise falls short of being a perfect 
expression of public trust law, but only because it does not explicitly state it is 
protecting these rights pursuant to the public trust.71  
                                                        
65 See PPL Montana, LLC, 565 U.S. at 580 (“The question is whether discrete, 
identifiable segments of these rivers in Montana were nonnavigable, as federal law defines 
that concept for purposes of determining whether the State acquired title to the riverbeds 
underlying those segments, when the State entered the Union . . . .”); Quick Facts, 
UTAH.GOV, https://www.utah.gov/about/quickfacts.html [https://perma.cc/WL6A-MUA8] 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
66 See Craig, supra note 6, at 93–194 (providing a comprehensive summary of various 
State’s public trust doctrine at the time the article was written).  
67 See Scanlan, supra note 57, at 132–34 (providing that, in Wisconsin, the legislature 
has a constitutional duty to protect the public’s right to access waters, which means closer 
judicial scrutiny is applied to statutes that endanger the public’s interest in the trust).  
68 UTAH CONST. art. XX, §1.  
69 See Craig, supra note 6, at 83–88.  
70 UTAH CONST. art. XVII, §1.  
71 See Craig, supra note 6, at 132. 
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Finally, in Article XI, section 6, Utah’s Constitution provides a strong 
admonition to municipal corporations, restricting their ability to dispose of or 
alienate certain water rights. “No municipal corporation, shall directly or 
indirectly . . . dispose of any . . . water rights” and water rights should “be devoted 
in like manner to the public supply of its inhabitants.”72 This provision supports the 
notion that the government should not dispose of water rights in any way that harms 
the public’s interest in those rights. In this way, it is quite similar to the initial 
pronouncement of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central, which required the 
states to hold water rights in trust for the people.73 
None of these provisions alone provide a clean constitutional expression of 
Utah’s public trust doctrine. However, the policies they promote and the specific 
language they use leave plenty of room to argue that the public trust is confirmed 
under Utah’s Constitution. 
 
2.  Key Cases in Utah’s Public Trust History 
 
In the absence of any explicit constitutional expression of Utah’s public trust 
doctrine, much of the defining law on the issue comes from cases dating back almost 
one hundred years.74 While many of the cases deal with the public trust doctrine in 
passing, a few cases make concrete determinations about the nature of the public’s 
ownership of water rights that are still relevant today. This section will examine a 
few of the quintessential Utah cases dealing with the public trust doctrine from the 
oldest case to the newest.  
 
(a)  Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co.75 
 
The court in Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co. provides 
Utah’s first real expression of the public trust doctrine.76 In the case, Utah-based 
shepherds who owned grazing lands in Box Elder County sued the Portage 
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Company to establish “the right of plaintiffs to the 
use of part of the waters of certain springs in Portage Canyon for culinary and stock 
                                                        
72 UTAH CONST. art. XI, §6.  
73 See Scanlan, supra note 57, at 130–33. Though Scanlan’s Article specifically 
discusses Wisconsin’s public trust doctrine, the requirements of the trustee to preserve the 
waters for use of the people remain largely the same from state to state. See also Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892). 
74 E.g., Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648 (Utah 1937); 
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672 (Utah 1902) (providing 
examples of the history of cases which are helpful in analyzing the history of the public trust 
doctrine in Utah). 
75 Adams, 72 P.2d at 648.  
76 Id.  
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watering purposes and to enjoin defendants from interfering with plaintiffs’ use 
thereof.”77 
The first beneficial point Adams makes is to confirm that the public has coequal 
rights to the waters, and those rights must be protected by the state government, who 
holds title to those waters through the equal footing doctrine for purposes of the 
trust.78 “The title [to public waters] thereto is in the public; all are equal owners; that 
is, have coequal rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control thereof. 
These waters are the gift of Providence; they belong to all as nature placed them or 
made them available.”79 The proposition that the public right to waters is coequal 
and not able to be exclusively controlled by one person is an essential piece of the 
public trust analysis, which is based on well-established social-contract based 
human rights theory.80 If the public has these rights, then any private or public action 
which restricts the public’s access to navigable waters would directly violate the 
trust and would be invalid under Adams. 
Adams additionally explains how water rights can be privately acquired.81 
Understanding the acquisition of water rights in the abstract is helpful in grasping 
the contours of the public trust doctrine’s work in practice. When faced with the 
concept that the public possesses coequal and nonexclusive rights to the corpus of 
the water, the clear follow-up question would be: But people obtain water rights all 
the time, how does that work if nobody can claim exclusive control of the water? 
The key is in understanding the difference between diverted and “wild” waters. 
“Having thus captured the ‘wild [waters],’ [a person] acquires a property right . . . 
as long as [he or she] maintains . . . possession.”82 Due to water’s complex physical 
properties,83 proving ownership of a moving river would be very difficult. Therefore, 
in Utah, to own water is not to own the corpus of the water itself, but the right to 
divert the water for use.84 But once the water is reduced to a form or state where it 
can be measured and accounted for, it is possible to acquire property rights to it.85 
However, the water in a natural river is decidedly beyond human control, and 
therefore is the coequal property of the citizens of the state.86 
                                                        
77 Id. at 650.  
78 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 435; PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 
576, 592 (2012) (“For state title under the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is determined 
at the time of statehood and based on the ‘natural and ordinary condition’ of the water.” 
(citations omitted)).  
79 Adams, 72 P.2d at 652.  
80 See BOWIE & SIMON, supra note 18, at 55. 
81 Adams, 72 P.2d at 653. 
82 Id. (citation omitted). 
83 “‘Such water,’ says Blackstone, ‘is a movable, wandering thing,’ here today and there 
tomorrow, like wild birds on the wing.” Id.  
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 652–53.  
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Finally, Adams gives a nod to the Utah Constitution in determining public 
ownership of the state’s waters. “This right of the public, as well as the rights of the 
appropriator, were confirmed by the State Constitution in article 17: All existing 
rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, 
are hereby recognized and confirmed.”87 Adams goes on to define beneficial use as 
“the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state.”88 
In providing this ruling, the court in Adams did three major things. First, it confirmed 
that the undiverted waters in the State of Utah are the coequal property of the citizens 
of Utah and distinguished ownership of diverted water from purported ownership of 
“wild” waters.89 Second, it acknowledged a constitutional basis for the extension of 
this right to use the water for beneficial uses.90 And third, the Adams court defined 
beneficial uses under the constitutional provision and provided that any use of waters 
that is not beneficial and economic will not supersede the right of the public to use 
and enjoy those waters.91 
 
(b)  J.J.N.P. v. State, By and Through Division of Wildlife Services92 
 
In the era after Adams, the coequal public right to the corpus of the water and 
distinctions in ownership were well accepted, but provisions for precisely how the 
public could use the waters were still a source of debate.93 The Utah Supreme Court 
addressed this issue in J.J.N.P. v. State, By and Through Division of Wildlife 
Services, and held that a “corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water 
is the rule that there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the 
water beds beneath the water.”94 
The birth of the idea that the easement creates the public right to use the water, 
regardless of who owns the beds beneath the water, marked a huge turning point in 
the law.95 Essentially, the easement grants the public the right to float on the water 
wherever it may naturally flow, regardless of whether the waters are navigable.96 
This means that those private landowners who own the area around a nonnavigable 
                                                        
87 Id. at 653 (quotation marks omitted).  
88 Id. at 654 (citation omitted). 
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). 
93 See generally Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957 (Utah 1943) (discussing the propriety 
of private appropriation of waters from the Provo river for power purposes); see also Day v. 
Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 140 (Wyo. 1961) (discussing a claim that the public has a right to 
use the bed and channel of a river for fishing and recreational purposes, and defendant may 
not exclude such use by the public).  
94 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. 
95 See id.; Day, 362 P.2d at 145.  
96 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137. 
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stream have no legal right to exclude the public from floating on a stream that passes 
through the landowner’s property.97  
Additionally, J.J.N.P. characterizes the easement as a “corollary of the 
proposition that the public owns the water.”98 The term “corollary” has its roots in 
mathematics and means “something that naturally follows.”99 The use of this word 
strongly suggests that the corollary easement to use the waters has existed for as 
long as the public has held the rights to the waters or since the equal footing doctrine 
granted those water rights to the state.  
Finally, J.J.N.P. provides strong language reinforcing the public trust doctrine 
in Utah. “Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and 
essential resource . . . is indispensable to the welfare of all the people . . . . The 
doctrine of public ownership is the basis upon which the State regulates the use of 
water for the benefit and well-being of the people.”100 In this quotation, the court 
provides support for the “beneficial use” theory of water usage. It also reinforces the 
specific exigencies of Utah’s climate and agricultural industry, which necessitate the 
existence of protections for public use of water in order to support Utah’s 
agricultural economy. 
J.J.N.P. provides two major legal footholds for future arguments: First, it 
confirms the existence of a corollary easement for the public to use the corpus of the 
water regardless of who owns the streambeds below.101 Second, it reinforces the 
policy concerns that necessitate the public’s ability to use waters freely.102 However, 
J.J.N.P.’s legacy left the public and the legislature confused on how exactly the 
public could use the waters.103 The confusion came with J.J.N.P.’s use of the word 
“utilize” when describing the easement’s protection of the public’s activities on the 
waters. “Irrespective of the ownership of the bed and navigability of the water, the 
public, if it can obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to . . . participate 
in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.”104 The problem this created was 
                                                        
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Corollary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
corollary [https://perma.cc/5Z79-9EDA] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
100 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.  
101 Id. (“A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the rule that 
there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the 
water.”). 
102 Id. (“Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential 
resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the 
State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of the water for the 
benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole.”). 
103 See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 901 (Utah 2008) (“Instead, we established 
our own rule that the public has ‘the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in 
any lawful activity when utilizing that water.’ The interpretive difference turns on [this] 
single, significant word.” (internal citations omitted)). 
104 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 (emphasis added).  
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similar to the problem addressed by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Day—which 
discussed the ways that ambiguous language regarding the use of the easement could 
create only the right to float on top of the water as opposed to the right to tread on 
the riverbed.105 By using the word “utilize” the J.J.N.P. court effectively broadened 
the easement through ambiguity to allow the public to tread on the streambeds as 
well, if doing so was necessary to “utilizing” the water.106 As a result, the public 
could now walk up privately owned riverbeds, stand on those beds to fish or float 
the rivers, and otherwise occupy privately owned land without repercussion.107 
Several years later, some of those private landowners took the issue to the court 
again.108 
 
(c)  Conatser v. Johnson109 
 
The plaintiffs in Conatser were river rafting on a portion of a stream that was 
privately owned.110 The plaintiffs were floating the river where it was deep and 
walking on the streambed where it was shallow.111 The private owner of the stream 
confronted the plaintiffs, telling them to exit the stream immediately.112 The 
Conatsers refused and were subsequently prosecuted for criminal trespass.113 The 
Conatsers sought to clarify the scope of the easement created by J.J.N.P.114 Post-
J.J.N.P., the public’s easement was generally interpreted broadly to cover lawful 
recreational activities which necessitated stepping on the beds of the stream.115 
However, private landowners looked to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in 
Day and argued that it restricted use of the riverbeds only to incidental “scraping” 
that may occur while floating a raft.116 Ultimately, the Conatser court clarified the 
J.J.N.P. standard for the easement. “[T]ouching the water’s bed is reasonably 
necessary and convenient for the effective enjoyment of the public’s easement . . . . 
The practical reality is that the public cannot effectively enjoy its right to ‘utilize’ 
                                                        
105 See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 149–51 (Wyo. 1961) (noting that, though the 
court ultimately held that the public had the right to tread on the streambed, the court noted 
that vagueness in statutory language regarding the public’s rights to use waters creates 
serious problems in the application of the penal law—in this case the law of trespass).  
106 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137. 
107 Id.  
108 See, e.g., Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 898–99. 
111 Id. at 899. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 897.  
114 Id. at 899. 
115 Id. at 902 (“The practical reality is that the public cannot effectively enjoy its right 
to ‘utilize’ the water to engage in recreational activities without touching the water’s bed.”). 
116 See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145–46 (Wyo. 1961). 
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the water . . . without touching the water’s bed.”117 This quotation establishes a very 
broad easement that allows the public to essentially walk on any streambed, whether 
publicly or privately owned, incidental to lawful use.118 This means that no private 
landowner may legally exclude someone from stepping on the beds of their privately 
owned stream, so long as that person is engaged in a “lawful activity” that requires 
utilization of the water.119  
Additionally, the court in Conatser took steps to clarify the public’s easement 
to use these streambeds as an interest in land. “[A]n easement ‘gives rise to two 
distinct property interests: a “dominant estate,” that has [the] right to use land of 
another, and a “servient estate,” that permits the exercise of that use.’”120 
Characterizing the easement as an interest in the land of the streambed rather than 
the body of the water is an important clarification in Conatser. The J.J.N.P. 
easement was a corollary of the public ownership of the water, and it was unclear 
whether the easement was the right to use the water or the streambed.121 Without 
knowing what actual property the public had an interest in, it was difficult to 
adjudicate properly the rights at stake. Moreover, characterizing the easement as a 
corollary interest in land which has existed in tandem for as long as the public has 
enjoyed coequal ownership of the waters of the state has important constitutional 
ramifications.122 
In response to the broad scope of the Conatser easement, Utah’s legislature 
enacted the Public Waters Access Act (PWAA).123 The PWAA allows an individual 
who owns private land through which a public waterway flows to restrict the public’s 
access to the waterway.124 The tension between the Conatser easement and the 
PWAA has created widespread confusion concerning whether the public has access 
to certain public waterways.125 In response to this confusion, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange Street Development126 took the 
PWAA’s side and held that Conatser was an incorrect statement of the public’s 
easement to use public waters.127  
  
                                                        
117 Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 Id. (quoting 25 AM. JUR. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 1 (2007)). 
121 J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982) 
(“A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the rule that there is a public 
easement over the water regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the water.”). 
122 See id. at 1136–1139. 
123 See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Orange St. Dev., 416 P.3d 553, 555 (Utah 2017); 
see also UTAH CODE §§ 73-29-101 to -202 (2018). 
124 See UTAH CODE § 73-29-201 (2018). 
125 See Orange Street, 416 P.3d at 559. 
126 416 P.3d 553 (Utah 2017). 
127 Id. at 559. 
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(d)  Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange Street Development 
 
In Orange Street, the Utah Stream Access Coalition sought to enjoin a group 
of private landowners from barring their right to access public waters.128 The parties, 
however, did not assert a quiet title claim, and therefore the court did not rule on 
whether the river was a public waterway under the PWAA.129 The court instead 
conducted an analysis of the federal and state standards for navigability. The court 
found that the federal standard for navigability, which contemplated navigability at 
the time of statehood, was incorporated into the statute.130 In doing so, the court 
acknowledged that, at least temporally, the determination of navigability is tied to 
the equal footing doctrine, rather than modern characteristics of waterways.131 This 
necessarily means that the standard of navigability as contemplated by the statute is 
also temporally rooted in conditions at the time of statehood.132  
This opinion, however, falls just short of granting the public the right to access 
the section of the Weber River at issue in the case.133 The court noted that because 
the parties did not raise a quiet title claim, the court would not quiet title to the Weber 
River, even though the opinion acknowledged ample evidence suggesting that the 
section of river is navigable, and therefore state-owned under the statute.134 
However, under the statute, even if the waterway was navigable and public, the 
owner of the property surrounding the public waterway could still exclude the public 
from accessing the waters.135 If a Utah court were to acknowledge a constitutional 
basis for the right to access public waters, this problematic exclusion of the public 
from waters the public ostensibly owns could provide the necessary basis for 
challenging the PWAA in the future.136 
 
(e)  Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions 
 
In VR Acquisitions, the Utah Supreme Court once again addressed the nature 
of the public’s interest in waters of the State of Utah.137 The Court ultimately 
declined to rule on the constitutional nature of the public’s easement to use waters 
of the state.138 Instead, the Court took the opportunity to, once again, clarify that the 
                                                        
128 Id. at 555. 
129 Id. at 556. 
130 Id. at 559. 
131 Id. at 556–58. 
132 Id. at 559. 
133 Id. at 561. 
134 Id. 
135 UTAH CODE § 73-29-201 (2017). 
136 See Orange Street, 416 P.3d at 563–64 (Durham, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
137 Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, No. 20151048, 2019 WL 761022, at 
*1 (Utah Feb. 20, 2019).  
138 Id. 
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Conatser decision was based on “common-law easement principles.”139 In doing so, 
the Court held that the district court erred in treating the Conatser easement as being 
constitutionally based, but declined to rule on the constitutionality of the easement 
itself.140 The Court then went on to discuss, in dicta, some of the constitutional 
arguments which the Utah Stream Access Coalition had presented, without 
definitively ruling on any of them.141 
The Court first examined the Conatser easement and the current landscape of 
Public Trust Law. This easement, the Court clarified, was recognized in order to 
balance the interests of landowners and the public, and was based on common-law 
principles rather than constitutional interpretation.142 Indeed, the Court in Conatser 
did not conduct any historical analysis of the constitutional basis of the easement at 
all.143 As such, when the Utah Stream Access Coalition relied on Conatser on appeal, 
they relied on the implication that the Conatser easement must be constitutionally 
based, rather than any explicit discussion of the constitutional basis for the 
easement.144 This was a stretch that the Court was not willing to make in VR 
Acquisitions, and the Court makes it clear that it will require much more than the 
implication present in Conatser to make a constitutional holding on the nature of the 
easement.145 Specifically, the inquiry must focus on “the scope of the public 
understanding of ‘lands of the State’ as of the time of the framing of the Utah 
Constitution.”146 
Moving forward from VR Acquisitions, the Court has indicated an openness to 
recognizing a constitutional basis for the public’s easement, provided that it is 
properly presented to the Court.147 This presentation must include an examination of 
the historical understanding of the public’s interest at the time the Utah Constitution 
was ratified in 1896.148 
  
                                                        
139 Id. 
140 Id. at *2. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at *3.  
143 Id.; See generally Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008) (omitting any 
discussion of a constitutional basis for the public’s easement.). 
144 Utah Stream Access Coal. v. VR Acquisitions, No. 20151048, 2019 WL 761022, at 
*5 (Utah Feb. 20, 2019).  
145 Id. (reversing on the basis of the district court’s “(implicit) conclusion that the scope 
of the easement recognized in [Conatser] was an interest in land that was “acquired” and 
“accepted” by the State at the time of the ratification of the Utah Constitution in 1896.” 
(citation omitted)). 
146 Id. at *12. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
This Note has thus provided an account of the relevant history and precedent, 
both state and federal, affecting the public trust analysis in the State of Utah. The 
remainder of this Note will examine the public’s constitutional right to touch 
privately owned streambeds incidental to lawful recreation as a right protected under 
the Utah Constitution.  
 
A.  Constitutional Protection Under Art. XVII, Section 1 
 
The Utah Constitution protects existing rights to use the waters of the state, in 
that “[a]ll existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful 
or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.”149 Under the equal 
footing doctrine, Utah received title to the waters of the state, to hold those waters 
in trust for the people, at the time Utah was granted statehood in 1896.150 Adams 
stands for the proposition that, “[t]hese waters are the gift of Providence; they belong 
to all as nature placed them or made them available.”151 
This quotation refers to the philosophical, if not theological, basis for holding 
that the public enjoys coequal ownership of the waters.152 The court in J.J.N.P. then 
established that the easement to utilize the water for lawful recreational purposes is 
a corollary of this right.153 If the easement results from a natural law right, and is 
therefore tied to the legal proposition that the public has a right to the waters of the 
state, then the easement would have been recognized and confirmed as an “existing 
right” under Article XVII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution when it was ratified in 
1895.154 If the easement is constitutionally guaranteed, that means any attempt to 
limit the public’s ability to utilize the waters for lawful recreational use is subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny.155 The notion that the easement has its basis in natural 
law is supported by Utah’s long tradition of recognizing the right to use water as 
belonging to the people since the days of the pioneers, and by the court’s consistent 
holdings that public ownership of the waters has always been the law.156 
                                                        
149 UTAH CONST. art. XVII, §1. 
150 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 580 (2012); History Facts, UTAH 
HISTORY TO GO, http://historytogo.utah.gov/facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/8UE4-C8Z2] 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2018).  
151 J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 n.3 (Utah 
1982) (quoting Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652–53 
(Utah 1937)). 
152 Id.  
153 Id. 
154 See UTAH CONST. art. XVII, §1; Utah State Constitution, UTAH DIV. OF ARCHIVES 
AND RECORDS SERVICE, https://archives.utah.gov/community/exhibits/Statehood/conintro. 
htm [https://perma.cc/876H-AFF5] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018).  
155 See Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081–82 (Utah 2002). 
156 See Adams, 72 P.2d at 653.  
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B.  Constitutional Protection Under Art. XX, Section 1 
 
Article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides “[a]ll lands of the State 
that have been . . . granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired . . . are 
declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the 
people.”157 As established in Conatser, the easement constitutes an interest in 
land,158 and as such, if it were acquired by the state, the easement should be entitled 
to constitutional protections under Article XX, section 1.159 
The common counter-argument is that the rights created in J.J.N.P. were 
judicially created, and could not have been affirmed by the constitution or acquired 
by the state because the state never took any affirmative action to accept 
responsibility for the easement.160 This argument, however, ignores the 
jurisprudential background of the public trust doctrine and the plain language in both 
J.J.N.P. and Conatser. Both cases discuss the right as being a “corollary” or 
necessary part of the right.161 Based on this language, the easement must have existed 
as long as the right, and the right has existed, at least in Utah, since the time of 
statehood. 
 
C.  Constitutional Recognition of the Public’s Right and Takings Claims 
 
Easements, even implied easements, are property interests protected from 
taking under Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution.162 This assertion supports 
two propositions. First, easements are in fact an interest in land, and therefore subject 
                                                        
157 UTAH. CONST. art. XX, §1. 
158 See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899 (Utah 2008) (providing that the public 
has “an interest . . . in the use of state waters for recreational purposes”). The easement 
includes the “right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when 
utilizing that water.” Id. at 899–900. Furthermore, the easement to use the water exists 
“[i]rrespective of the ownership of the bed and the navigability of the water.” Id. at 900. 
Because public ownership of the water itself is well established, the easement is an interest 
in the land beneath the waters, which allows the public to use the waters for lawful 
recreational activities regardless of who owns the bed. Therefore, the easement encompasses 
the right to touch privately owned streambeds incidental to the use of the publicly owned 
waters. 
159 UTAH CONST. art. XX, §1. 
160 J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982); 
Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902. 
161 J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.  
162 UTAH CONST. art. I, §22 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation.”); John Martinez, A Framework for Addressing Takings 
Problems, 9 UTAH B.J. 13, 15 (1996) (“The relevant property defined, the next question is 
whether there has been a ‘taking’ of it. As a threshold matter, the takings claimant would 
have to decide whether to challenge the governmental action ‘as applied’ to his/her particular 
property or ‘on its face,’ . . . . In general, whether a taking has occurred involves 
consideration of the character of the governmental action . . . .”). 
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to analysis under Article XX. Second, the counter-argument that the J.J.N.P. 
easement was a taking against private landowners is unsound. This is because the 
easement is a corollary to the natural law and has always existed.163 Assuming that 
the easement is based on natural law and has always existed, there is no potential for 
a takings claim here. The fact that the easement has existed as long as the public’s 
right has existed means that no property actually changed hands between private 
landowners and the government. The analysis for a takings claim requires some sort 
of government action against the landowner.164 If the easement has existed since 
statehood, the government would have taken no action against private landowners 
because the easement was established at the same time the state government was 
established. 
Arguing for the proposition that the easement has always existed, and therefore 
cannot be a taking, opens an entirely separate can of worms in the area of title 
insurance claims. When a title insurance company insures title to a parcel of land, 
they do so as a warrant that the land is unencumbered by any title defects.165 A 
holding that the easement was a constitutionally protected interest in land which has 
existed since the time of statehood essentially means that every parcel of land with 
a river running through it, regardless of navigability, would have been encumbered 
by this easement.166 In other words, the unintended side effect of holding that the 
easement is subject to constitutional protections, is the possibility of a wave of title 
insurance claims and landowners seeking to recover taxes paid on streambeds 
crossing their lands. 
 
D.  How the State Is Authorized to Manage the Trust 
 
Because the easement is arguably a constitutionally recognized right under 
Article XVII, section 1, Utah’s common-law public trust doctrine should govern the 
regulation of public waters “as trustee for the benefit of the people.”167 The precedent 
on the federal side supports a “substantial impairment” test—i.e., the state may 
dispose of public trust rights for the benefit of the public trust when there is no 
substantial impairment to the public’s interest.168 In Illinois Central, the U.S. 
Supreme Court established that the state can dispose of trust lands so long as there 
                                                        
163 See supra Sections II.A, II.B; see also PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 
576, 601–03 (2012) (holding that the relevant inquiry of Public Trust rights should focus on 
the legal landscape at the time of statehood).  
164 See Martinez, supra note 162, at 15.  
165 See 38 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D, Proof of Title Insurance Claims, § 19 (2017). 
166 See Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899–900 (Utah 2008). 
167 J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). 
168 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892) (“It is the settled law of 
this country that the ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered by tide 
waters, within the limits of the several states, belong to the respective States within which 
they are found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that 
can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters . . . .”). 
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is no “substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining.”169 The cases following Illinois Central support a need for the disposal 
of the public trust rights to benefit the public, such as the disposal of shoreland to a 
private party that they might build a publicly accessible dock.170 Although Article 
XX does not include a substantial impairment test, it still provides that the lands 
acquired by the state are held in trust.171 Using the Illinois Central test, the state must 
neither dispose of the rights in a way which substantially impairs the public’s interest 
nor do so in a way that does not serve the public interest.172  
If a court were not to apply the Illinois Central test and instead were to rely on 
a careful reading of Article XX of the Utah Constitution, it would find no express 
substantial impairment or public benefit requirement. Instead, the state would have 
extensive authority to “dispose of” the land (or the easement as an interest in land) 
as may be provided by law.173 To provide such broad legislative power would be 
against both the long-standing principle that the state holds title to the waters of the 
state in the public trust and that the public has a right to access the waters. 
A close reading of Illinois Central requires the state to dispose of the lands in 
a way that is for the benefit of the public trust. Moreover, the state must do so in a 
way that does not create a substantial impairment of the remaining waters. This 
seems to be the best way to establish the scope of the legislature’s ability to dispose 
of the easement, rather than relying solely on the expansive language of Article XX. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the unique legal background of Utah’s public trust doctrine, the 
public’s easement to touch streambeds of rivers in Utah, regardless of their status as 
public or private lands, merits constitutional protection. The reason for this is simple: 
The state holds its waters in trust for the benefit of the public. A corollary of the 
public’s ownership of the waters of the state is an easement that allows the public to 
use those waters for lawful recreation and to—incidental to those activities—touch 
the beds of those streams. Because this easement is a corollary to the original 
doctrine of public ownership, it was confirmed as an “existing right” under Article 
XVII, section 1. Additionally, because the easement is an interest in land, the 
easement itself was “otherwise acquired” by the state under the equal footing 
doctrine and Article XX, section 1. Once the easement was acquired by the state, the 
state had the duty to maintain that easement for the benefit of the public and could 
not dispose of the easement if doing so did not benefit the public or if it substantially 
hindered the public’s interest in the waters. Despite these protections, the state may 
                                                        
169 Id. at 452. 
170 See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894) (providing an example where 
the court authorized the state to dispose of public riverbeds to a private party in order to allow 
the private party to build a publicly accessible dock on the waters). 
171 UTAH CONST. art. XX, §1. 
172 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453. 
173 UTAH CONST. art. XX, §1. 
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still dispose of the easement, as well as the publicly owned beds of navigable rivers, 
if doing so served the interest of the public as a whole.  
As of today, public trust law in Utah is unclear and subject to change by the 
legislature or Supreme Court precedent. With the growth of privatized recreation 
companies that may seek to restrict access to certain parts of rivers for fishing or 
rafting and to only allow access to fee-paying members, it is vital that Utah establish 
ironclad legal doctrine protecting the public’s right to access the waters they 
coequally own. Recognizing a constitutional basis for this easement is the best way 
to achieve this goal.  
